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Reviewed by Randy E. Barnett

There is nothing really new about the iconoclasm of the American realists.
What is new, however, is the reception of their notions among lawyers, and
in this sense the great significance of the realist movement for legal history
lies in the recognition that it is possible to have lawyers, and flourishing
lawyers, without law in the sense that law traditionallyhas been understood.

Whether this state of affairs is to be regretted or welcomed is debatable, but
it is clear that it offers no hospitality to the legal treatise.
-A.W.B.
Simpson3

It has been thirty years since Arthur Corbin's eight-volume treatise
on contracts appeared in condensed form as a one-volume edition.
No scholarly book on contract law of comparable scope has been
published since. This void in contract law scholarship has been filled
only by the occasional law review article, by books discussing particular aspects of contract law, and by the ongoing revisions of the
Restatement of Contracts that culminated in the publication of the

Restatement (Second) of Contracts4 in 1979.
As Simpson pointed out, the dominant legal climate has not been
friendly to any form of literature that attempts to explicate legal

doctrine systematically, and this attitude has been particularly prevalent in contract law.5 That Professor Farnsworth's treatise on con-

1 Alfred McCormick Professor, Columbia University School of Law.
2 Assistant Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
B.A., Northwestern University, I974; J.D., Harvard University, 1977. I would like to thank
the following people for commenting on an earlier version of this Book Review: Lewis Collens,
Richard Epstein, Sheldon Nahmod, .Cass Sunstein, and A. Dan Tarlock. I am particularly
indebted to Mary Becker for her extraordinarily detailed and comprehensive critique of both
the style and substance of my earlier effort. I am also very grateful for the research assistance
provided by James R. Flynn. Of course, I am solely responsible for the views expressed in this
Review.
3 Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal
Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 632, 679 (I98i); see also Stone, From a Language Perspective,
9o YALE L.J. 1149, 1150 (ig8i) ("Treatises, some of them splendid, are still being written, but
the prestige of the undertaking has tarnished." (footnotes omitted)). Professor Stone also attributes the decline of the treatise to legal realism. See id. at 1S.
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979).
5 For a summary description of the intellectual climate among contract scholars, see C.

FReED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1-6 (I98r). At one point in this discussion, Fried identifies, a
group of critics who maintain that "the search for a central or unifying principle of contract is
a will-o'-the-wisp, an illusion typical of the ill-defined but much excoriated vice of conceptualism." Id. at 3.
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tracts should make its appearance now is, therefore, a development
worth explaining. It is my contention that the publication of this book
at this time may be in part a product of the increased support from
legal philosophers in recent years for traditional forms of legal reasoning based on principle and expressed through doctrine.
This new interest in traditional methods of legal reasoning has
been sparked by the resurgence of normative legal philosophy, which
over the last fifteen years has been displacing the schools of legal
positivism and realism that once dominated legal thinking. 6 One can
demonstrate the power and breadth of the new sympathy for normative legal philosophy and for traditional legal reasoning by merely
listing its proponents and their institutional affiliations: Bruce A. Ackerman (Yale, then Columbia), Ronald Dworkin (Oxford), Richard
Epstein (Chicago), John Finnis (Oxford), George Fletcher (UCLA,
then Columbia), Charles Fried (Harvard), and Anthony Kronman
(Chicago, then Yale). Also participating in the debate in an important
if somewhat skeptical way are P.S. Atiyah (Oxford) and Joseph Raz
(Oxford). 7 This is a formidable list of thinkers and writers, and it
appears all the more formidable when one considers that it is hardly
exhaustive. The list excludes many legal philosophers who are not
law professors, such as Joel Feinberg and Jeffrie G. Murphy, 8 and
doubtlessly other well-known and less well-known legal writers as
well.
As significant as the talents and credentials of the members of this
group is the fact that these thinkers represent a spectrum of ideological
views, embracing modern liberal, classical liberal, 9 and conservative
philosophies. The legal thinkers constituting this new coalition agree
that normative legal philosophy is meaningful and useful and that
refining legal doctrine through traditional forms of legal analysis
6 The existence of this new movement has been noticed by others, who, incidentally, view
it favorably. See, e.g., Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, go YALE L.J. 113,
1126 (i98i) (commenting upon "the new philosophy (or philosophies) of law'); Shapiro, On the
Regrettable Decline of Law French: Or Shapiro Jettet Le Brickbat, go YALE L.J. l198, 1203

(I981) (referring to "the new jurisprudence of values'); Sunstein, Politics and Adjudication, 94
ETHICS 126 (1983).
7 Even a partial list of this group's relevant publications is impressive: B. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (198o); P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW
(I98i); R. DWommI', TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS (i980); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978); J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW (1979); Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253 (1980);
Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970 (i98i); Kronman, Contract Law and

Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (i98o).
8 See, e.g., Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243 (1970);
Murphy, Consent, Coercion and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REv. 79 (198i). Feinberg's essay is
expanded in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 270 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross 2d ed. i98o).

9 This position is now sometimes called libertarianism and has recently been identified as
the "New Liberalism." See Barry, The New Liberalism, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCi. 93 (1983).
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grounded on the identification of moral principles is a defensible and
worthwhile activity. '0
In Part I of this Review, I briefly trace the rise of the normative.
legal philosophy that accounts for the reemergence of traditional legal
scholarship. This growth is attributable to certain historical and intellectual developments of recent decades that can be only superficially
described here. Nevertheless, a proper historical perspective on Professor Farnsworth's treatise requires such an attempt. Although the
book is not itself a philosophical work, the intellectual history of the
past thirty years suggests that its publication at this time may reflect
a renewal of confidence among jurisprudential thinkers in the value
of legal reasoning and doctrinal analysis in private law. In Part II, I
discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the book and argue
that the book fails to employ the rights-based analysis introduced by
legal philosophers in recent years, an analysis that cotuld help to
resolve fundamental tensions in contract law.
I.
A. The Decline of Legal Positivism
In an intriguing address given in 1952 and entitled "The Needs of
American Legal Philosophy,"" Lon L. Fuller noted several "retarding" influences on American legal philosophy that he maintained were
keeping it from significant tasks. Among these influences was "a
conception that defines the lawyer's lifework entirely in terms of state
power, which treats him as a technician whose special aptitude is that
of predicting and influencing the impact of state power."' 12 Fuller
identified both the legal positivism of Holmes and Gray and the
American legal realist movement as embodiments of this view.'13
What characterized this attitude and, in Fuller's view, hampered
the growth of legal philosophy was the divorcing of legal thought from
10 These thinkers are divided, however, about whether to pursue a legal framework dominated by a conception of public law or one organized around privat law. The renewal of
serious interest in the private law subjects of contracts, torts, and property as a source of social
order distinct from and perhaps preferable to public law is a significant development as well.
11 L. FULLER, The Needs of American Legal Philosophy, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
ORDER (K. Winston ed. ig8i). For an insightful review of this collection of Fuller's essays that
shows its relationship to current controversies, see Sunstein, supra note 6.
12 L. FULLER, Supra note ii, at 250.

13Professor Summers suggests that, although Fuller used the term 'Jlegal positivism," the
tradition he was reacting to was broader than positivism. Summers describes this view of law
as "pragmatic instrumentalism":
This philosophy is "instrumentalist" in that it conceives of law not as means-goal
complexes but merely as means to external goals. It is "pragmatic" in several ways. It
focuses on law in action and on the practical differences that law makes. It stresses the
roles of legal actors and their technological "know-how." It is experimentalist. It is
pragmatic, too, in its professed contextualism - its reliance on time, place, circumstance,
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attention to the law as it ought to be. To be sure, the prevailing
attitude did not prevent a lawyer from having opinions on what the
law ought to be, but the legal positivists and realists deemed the tools
of legal reasoning to be unsuited to such an inquiry. When a lawyer
expressed his opinions on the law "as it ought to be," he did so not
as a lawyer, but as a private citizen with no more expertise than any

other. 14
At the time Fuller spoke, and for two decades thereafter, legal
positivism and legal realism dominated intellectual discourse about
law.' 5 But with the appearance of the "Hart-Fuller" debate in the
late 1950'S16 - and especially with the publication of Hart's The
Concept of Law17 in 1961 and Fuller's The Morality of Law 8 in 1964
- it became increasingly apparent that the different schools of legal
philosophy were using the term "law" in very different senses. When
legal positivists and realists spoke of "law," they were referring only
to the sum total "of actually enacted statutes and regulations and to
the actions of judges - the system of rules that, like it or not (and
rightly or wrongly), were backed by the threat of force. The reality
of enforcement, they maintained, could not be wished away; the
question of what the law is had to be distinguished from fundamentally different concerns about what the law ought to be. By contrast,
when natural law thinkers like Fuller discussed "law," they were
speaking of the underlying moral character of law that creates at a
minimum a prima facie duty to obey the law's dictates and that
justifies the use of force to ensure compliance. For Fuller and his
allies, therefore, choices about what counted as law could never be
value-neutral.
This dispute has important implications for judicial decisionmaking. If the law consists only of enacted statutes and other rules, the
judge has a legal duty to enforce these rules; when enforcing the "law"
interests, wants, and the assumed malleability of reality rather than on theories, general
principles, and the "nature of things" as sources of ends and means.
Summers, Professor Fullers Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92
HAsv. L. REV. 433, 435 (1978) (emphasis added). Although this Review employs the narrower
and more traditional terms of "positivism" and "realism," I will be referring to the larger
philosophy identified by Professor Summers. This notion of a larger philosophy is consistent
with my suggestion that the law-and-economics movement is in the same intellectual tradition
as positivism and realism and that it is this tradition that the new normative legal philosophy
is responding to and, perhaps, supplanting.
14 See L. FULLER, supra note ii, at 251-52.
IsFor an excellent narration of this debate and its roots, see E. PURCELL, THE CmsIs OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973).

16 See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593
(1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630 (1958).
17 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (ig6i).
Is L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (x964).
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conflicts with principles of justice, the judge can at most bemoan the
injustice and urge the legislature to change the law. Within positivism, a judge would have a legal duty to enforce, for example, statutes
requiring the enslavement or execution of members of a minority
group or some other form of morally repugnant governmental discrimination. On the other hand, if one deems the concept of law to include
normative principles of justice in addition to statutory and judicially
created rules, a conflict between rule and principle obligates a judge
to favor the principle that will lead to the just result. A theory
acknowledging that principles of justice are a part of the law would
authorize a judge to strike down laws that the positivist judge would
be legally obligated to enforce.19
Although legal positivism still exerts a powerful hold over many
legal academics and students, the' growing strength of the new normative philosophy may indicate that the positivist separation of law
from morals is currently on the wane. Its decline cannot be explained
solely by an assertion that the moral analysis foreshadowed by Fuller's
writings is a superior approach. Ideas tend to be ineffective unless
outside circumstances conspire to make them timely.20 What were
the circumstances that made a shift away from the legal positivism of
Hart and others so attractive to so many?
Of course, because different people change their opinions for different reasons, such a question will resist the most intense scrutiny.
Certain developments, however, seem to be particularly important.
The civil rights movement and the war in Vietnam had an enormous
impact on a segment of society - students and professional academics
that is normally spared discomfort in times of discomfort. These
groups had been America's main repository of value skepticism, relativism, and nihilism. In law schools, the embodiment of these attitudes - legal positivism and legal realism - had created little dissonance in the post-New Deal era. But the increasingly common
perception that some laws were "unjustly" discriminatory and that the
war in Indochina was "unjust" required a new intellectual acceptance
of moral analysis as a legitimate mode of thought. The subjection of
millions to the choice among the draft, prison, and exile in Canada
often made this requirement a very personal one. Were the draft laws
just? Did they have to be obeyed? Were such questions matters of
legitimate legal scholarship? Positivism provided less than satisfying
answers.
19See Fletcher, supra note 7. Fletcher hypothesizes that this quandary may be a peculiarly
Anglo-Saxon problem. Other legal traditions use one word to describe enacted rules (Gesetz,
loi, ley, zakon, torveny) and another to describe the law that includes principles of justice (Recht,
droit, derecho, prava, jog). See id. at 980-82.
20 The best-known description of this process of change in theories is T. KIUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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This period also saw a massive crackdown on drug consumption.
The poor had long been familiar with this type of encounter with the
legal system, but when the middle and upper classes acquired a taste
for prohibited drugs, these groups as well became, for the first time,
frequent targets of arrest and prosecution for violating statutes that
proscribed something other than violations of other persons' rights.
The "war on drugs" also shared with the war in Vietnam the cycle
of initial promises providing the rationale for the policy, followed by
failure to achieve the stated goals and - indeed - aggravation of
the very problems the policy had been offered to solve, 2 1 and, finally,
calls for escalation. An entire generation began to challenge the axiom
that the state is us and we are the state.
Classical liberals had long observed that war has always fuelled
and justified the growth of state power and increased the wealth of
the segments of the population that profit from expansion of the
state.2 2 Objections to these effects were, for a time, squelched by the
war against the Nazis and by the postwar policeman role of the United
States, 23 but they now began to be reasserted. The redistribution of
wealth to the "military-industrial complex" and the massive violations
of civil liberties justified by national security may have been tolerated
when the country was directly threatened, but not when it was fighting
the war in Vietnam.
The social tumult associated with the war was accompanied by a
rapid acceleration of social programs that were supposed to redistribute large quantities of wealth from some groups in society to others.
These programs created still more feelings of resentment, opposition,
and alienation - but this time among people many of whom supported the war and were largely unaffected by the civil rights movement. Furthermore, as time went on, the increasing perception that
the social programs had failed to deliver on their promises to correct
the causes of such social problems as poverty and crime made it harder
to label the critics of these programs cold-hearted.
Before long, except for the interest groups that directly profited
from both the "welfare state" and the "warfare state," virtually every
important segment of society had serious objections to some portion
of the laws of the federal and state governments. Similar social
environments of discontent have long provided fertile ground for theories of natural rights that postulate "higher laws" capable of overrid21 See, e.g., J. KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG (1983). For a discussion of the relationship
between drug controls and a rights-based jurisprudence, see Barnett, PublicPolicy and Private
Rights (Book Review), 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS (forthcoming 1984).
22 See, e.g., J. FLYNN, AS WE Go MARCHING (ist ed. 1944); R. RADoSH, PROPHETS ON
THE RIGHT (I975); Radosh, Preface to J. FLYNN, supra, at vii-xv (2d ed. 1973).
23 See R. RADOSH, supra note 22, at 15.
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ing objectionable state pronouncements. Thus, it is not surprising
that legal positivism would suffer in an era when civil disobedience
was openly discussed and practiced by large segments of the population and when significant numbers of persons were being imprisoned
for violations of draft and drug laws.
As various forms of state intervention came increasingly under fire,
a new and lively intellectual movement arose. The "law-and-economics" school applied the insights of neoclassical economics to the ever
more apparent problems of social order and welfare, but did not
abandon the positivism of science or of law. The application of
neoclassical methodology to the study of law differed from previous
attempts to merge science with law and gained an enormous and
lasting influence on legal discourse by providing a critical analysis of
state power in all of its guises at a time when such a critique was
widely desired.
Although the law-and-economics approach purported to justify
some actions of the state, it also provided potent "scientific" arguments
against many others - arguments that were consistent with both
positivism and realism. Proponents of law and economics argued that
programs of forced redistribution and regulation for the common good
did not achieve their stated goals, but instead enriched segments of
society other than those for whose benefit they were supposedly implemented. Moreover, this enrichment came at the expense of the
productive members of all classes, including the poor. Law and economics promised to answer important questions of policy, provided
only that there was consensus about the ends being sought. It refocused attention on the traditional doctrines of contract, tort, and
property as the most "efficient" means of ordering society. Law and
economics was a view that caught on like no other since realism.
But the law-and-economics movement also had its share of detractors. Quite naturally, the designers and supporters of the social
programs under attack were aghast at the increasing popularity of the
movement. After all, the "free market" had been successfully banished from civilized discussion along with the Nine Old Men of the
Lochner era. But the problems of the day -and the power of the new
approach prevented intellectual defenders of state power from dismissing the law-and-economics movement as a reactionary approach
or ignoring it altogether. Without some theory to justify it, the social
order that modern liberals had fought so hard to achieve was in danger
of sinking under the combined weight of public opposition to its
coercive impositions and of the economic analysis that plausibly suggested how and why past statist attempts at social problem solving
just "didn't work." What was needed was a defense of statist socialproblem-solving techniques that justified their continued and expanded application while excusing their failures.
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B. The Reemergence of Normative Legal Philosophy
With the publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice in I97 1,24
the intellectual terrain began to shift. Rawls made the philosophical
discussion of right and wrong respectable again. He attempted to
provide a framework within which principles of justice could be intelligibly discussed and debated. Such a framework promised to provide an antidote to the efficiency or utilitarian analysis of the lawand-economics school and a justification for maintaining some semblance of the New Deal/Great Society approach to social problem
solving. For example, if the current redistributive exercises of state
power created moral "entitlements" to their continuation, the efficiency
of such laws and programs would become irrelevant. But to defend
the moral justification of the existing governmental structure, one had
and
to jettison moral relativism or skepticism and legal positivism,
25
recognize the legitimacy of normative discourse in law.
This return to moral philosophy had an important - though
unintended - consequence. If moral discourse could be used to
defend statism, it could also be used to attack modern exercises of
state power in much the same way that classical liberals had wielded
moral arguments against mercantilism and imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.2 6 And indeed, it did not take long
for classical liberals to capitalize on the newfound respectability of
moral principles. In i974, Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia appeared. 27 Rawls had opened the door for Nozick's critique of
distributive justice.2 8 Nozick's classical liberal or "libertarian" 29 approach conceived of justice as the protection of individual rights. 30
24

J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

25

In constitutional law, the new attractiveness of normative theories of law supported an

analogous renewal of interest in the long-belittled theory of substantive due process. See, e.g.,
G. GuNTIER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 570-646 (ioth ed. 1975). If the i 4 th amendment did not
"enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (19o5)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), it was no longer because it enacted no theory of substantive due process
- rather, it enacted a different one. Nor could the argument that the guarantee of due process
had substantive content any longer be disparagingly characterized as positing a "brooding
omnipresence in the sky," Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
26 See, e.g., H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 359-60 (London 1851) ("Indeed, all colonizing
expeditions down to those of our own day, with its American annexations, its French occupations
of Algiers and Tahiti, and its British conquests of Scinde, and of the Punjaub, have borne a
very repulsive likeness to the doings of buccaneers.").
27 R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
28 See id. at 149-231.
29 Of course, Nozick was not the first to use this term or defend this position. See, e.g.,
M. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEw LIBERTY (ist ed. 1973).
30

Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them
(without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise
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This view became a newly acknowledged alternative to modern liberalism, conservatism,-and Marxism. Nozick's book succeeded in
reintroducing the argument that human beings possess certain identifiable and fundamental rights that make state expropriation of their
31
persons and property not only inefficient, but unjust.
Nozick, like Rawls, largely confined his analysis to moral and
political philosophy. But although neither thinker attempted to apply
his analysis systematically to problems of legal principle and doctrine,
the individual rights that underlay Nozick's views of abstract justice
were precisely the private rights of property, contract, and tort that
had long formed the body of the common law. The time was now
ripe for a new theory of private rights - a theory that might provide
an alternative to public law. Such a theoretical endeavor would consist, in part, of a new appreciation for and defense of the traditional
modes of legal analysis - namely, the articulation of principle and
doctrine - upon which the common law system of interpretation and
enforcement of rights depends.
In a series of articles that began to appear even before the publication of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Richard A. Epstein comprehensively described and defended a rights-based theory of strict liability in tort. 32 Epstein's initial explanation of this approach relied
primarily on an historical analysis of legal doctrine, but with each
article the rights-based nature of his theory became increasingly explicit. Significantly, Epstein's methodology of legal analysis (as well
as many of his conclusions) was in direct conflict with the law-andeconomics approach that had yielded "efficiency" defenses of negligence theory.
After the publication of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, rights-based
theories of justice became the subject of intense intellectual discussion.
the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do. How much room
do individual rights leave for the state? The nature of the state, its legitimate functions
and its justifications, if any, is the central concern of this book . . . . This book does
not present a precise theory of the moral basis of individual rights . . . . Much of what
I say rests upon or uses general features that I believe such theories would have were
they worked out.
R. NOZICK, supra note 27, at ix, xiv.
31 In the first part of the book, however, Nozick elaborates certain circumstances in which,
he argues, state expropriation of property and persons may be justified. See id. at 1-148. But
see M. ROTHBARD, Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State, in THE ETHICS
OF LIBERTY 229 (1982) (attempting to refute Nozick's argument); id. at 247 n.i (citing other
such attempts).
32 See Epstein, A Theory of StrictLiability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. i51 (1973); Epstein, Pleadings
and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 556 (1973); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in
a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. i65 (i974); Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Epstein, Causationand CorrectiveJustice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979); Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). Professor Epstein explores these ideas further in C.
GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 47-99 (3d ed. 1977).
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In 1977, three years after the appearance of Nozick's book, Ronald
Dworkin published Taking Rights Seriously. 33 Dworkin stood with
Rawls in opposing moral and legal positivism, with Nozick in advocating a rights-based approach to justice, 34 and with Epstein in defending normative legal philosophy and traditional modes of legal
analysis. 35 Legal positivism and the empiricism of the law-and-economics movement were now confronted by challenges from both freemarket classical liberals like Nozick and Epstein and modern liberals
like Rawls and Dworkin.
In 1979, at a symposium held at the University of Chicago Law
School and entitled "Change in the Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspectives," this new coalition of normative legal philosophers
emerged. Presenting the case for efficiency were Richard A. Posner,
William M. Landes, George Priest, and Paul Rubin. Arrayed in
opposition were, among others, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Epstein,
Anthony Kronman, and Charles Fried. Significantly, two economists,
Gerald O'Driscoll, Jr., and Mario Rizzo, also criticized the efficiency
model of law.3-6 Considering their own substantial disagreements, the
critics of law and economics presentea a remarkably united front in
arguing on behalf of justice and against efficiency as the ultimate
measure of law. Dworkin and Kronman concentrated their attack on
the normative implications of the law-and-economics approach, 37
33 R. DWORKIN, supra note 7. Because Dworkin's words so clearly reflect the social and
intellectual turbulence that I have argued accounts for the rise of normative legal philosophy,
they are worth quoting at length:
The language of rights now dominates political debate in the United'States. Does the
Government respect the moral and political rights of its citizens? Or does the Government's foreign policy, or its race policy, fly in the face of these rights? Do the minorities
whose rights have been violated have the right to violate the law in return? Or does the
silent majority itself have rights, including the right that those who break the law be
punished? It is not surprising that these questions are now prominent. The concept of
rights, and particularly the concept of rights against the Government, has its most natural
use when a political society is divided, and appeals to co-operation or a common goal
are pointless . . . . I shall not be concerned, in this essay, to defend the thesis that
citizens have moral rights against their governments; I want instead to explore the
implications of that thesis for those, including the present United States Government,
who profess to accept it.
Id. at 184. The similarity between Dworkin's manner of exposition and Nozick's is striking.
See supra note 30.
34 Curiously, although Dworkin devoted a whole chapter of Taking Rights Seriously to
denying the coherence of a "right to liberty," he failed to take any express notice of Anarchy,
State, and Utopia or its arguments. Instead of analyzing Nozick's property-rights-based conception of liberty, which was then receiving wide attention, Dworkin attacked John Stuart Mill's
concept of liberty, which was not the subject of nearly as much attention as was Nozick's at
the time Dworkin wrote. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 266.
35 Dworkin's opposition to positivism and realism and his defense of traditional modes of
legal analysis had begun in the late ig6o's, but it had lacked an explicit rights-based moral
theory at that time. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967).
36 Other participants in the symposium included Michael A. Becker, Neil Kent Komesar,
Leonard Liggio, A. Dan Tarlock, Stephen F. Williams, and the author of this Review.
37 See Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (ig8o); Kronman, Wealth
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O'Driscoll and Rizzo focused mainly on the descriptive flaws of the
efficiency approach, 38 and Epstein and Fried presented affirmative
analyses of traditional legal reasoning based on moral principles and
39
doctrine.
It was a watershed event for both the powerful law-and-economics
movement and the new normative legal philosophy; it may well turn
40
out that the former suffered serious injury at the hands of the latter.
The new normative legal philosophy responded to legal positivism's
strict division of "law as it is" from "law as it ought to be" by using
principles of justice to justify traditional modes of legal reasoning and
doctrinal analysis. In so doing, it undercut the amoralism and pragmatism of both the efficiency approach of law and economics and the
views of the legal realists. Although law and economics still survives,
it has been sufficiently shaken to make possible a challenge to the
orthodoxy of Posnerian efficiency - a challenge such as the one
presented by the development of an economic analysis of law in the
41
"Austrian" tradition of Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek.
But what is left of legal realism? In the wake of the intellectual
developments of recent years, there appears to be only one group that
Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (198o). For Posner's reply, see
Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243
(198o).
38 See O'Driscoll, Justice, Efficiency and the Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment on
Fried, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (r98o); Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and
Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980).
39 See Epstein, supra note 7; Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral
and Legal History, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 335 (i980). The papers presented at the Chicago symposium are reproduced in the ninth volume of the Journal of Legal Studies, but the debate was
carried over into an issue of the Hofstra Law Review. See Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal
Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (298o).
40 Contra Priest, The Rise of Law and Economics (Yale Law School Program in Civil
Liability, Working Paper No. 7, 1982). Although he agrees that the influence of the law-andeconomics movement has probably crested, Professor Priest supports this contention by citing
the Hofstra symposium, not the symposium in the Journal of Legal Studies. He asserts that
"no competing theories arose to provide better explanations of the law than Posner's ....
Rather, Posnerism fell of its own weight." Id. at 6o. This is a doubtful explanation in light of
commonsense views and shared experiences about how and why any theory rises or falls in
general acceptance or influence. See generally T. KUHN, supra note 20 (describing the process
by which new explanatory paradigms succeed older ones). Professor Priest was in attendance
at the Chicago symposium, but he neither discusses nor acknowledges the roles played by
Dworkin, Kronman, Fried, Epstein, Rizzo, and O'Driscoll in bringing the Posnerian version of
law and economics into question.
41 Hayek's analysis of law as a force that facilitates the maintenance and growth of a
"spontaneous order" is one example of such an approach. See 1-2 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1973-1976). For an introduction to Austrian economics, see THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (E. Dolan ed. 1976). Rizzo's and O'Driscoll's
writings are in this tradition. See, e.g., G. O'DRISCoLL, ECONOMICS AS A COORDINATION
PROBLEM (1977); O'Driscoll, supra note 38; Rizzo, supra note 38. For a brief discussion of the
differences between the Austrian and neoclassical approaches to the problem of cost, see J.
BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE (1969).
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still elevates the legal realist critique of traditional legal analysis to a
42
central place in their approach: the critical legal studies (CLS) group.
The image that members of the CLS group like to paint is that
traditional legal scholarship is in a "crisis" for which they are largely
responsible, and that many if not most significant recent developments
in traditional legal scholarship are a reaction to this crisis. 4 3 The CLS
"movement," however, can be traced only to the late i97o's. 44 It
cannot, therefore, be responsible for the new normative legal philosophy that had already begun to emerge several years earlier. 45 Moreover, contrary to the assertions of CLS writers, there is less sense of
"crisis" in traditional legal scholarship today than in recent memory;
in fact, there appears to be a rapidly growing mood of self-confi46
dence.
42 Regrettably, I cannot here undertake an adequate commentary on the views of these
critics of traditional legal thought and private law. For a more comprehensive critical assessment, see Sunstein, supra note 6; Levinson, EscapingLiberalism:Easier Said Than Done (Book
Review), 96 HARv. L. REV. 1466 (1983).
43 "The discipline's growing self-consciousness is largely attributable to the critical legal
scholars, a small group of academics who emerged as a self-identified school in the late 1970's."
Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to CriticalLegal Scholarship,
95 HARv. L. REv. I669, 1669 (1982).
44 "The Conference on Critical Legal Studies was founded in 1977." Id. n.3. The timing
of this movement makes for some interesting speculation. It may be that the founding of the
Conference was motivated by the CLS founders' increasing sense of isolation from the mainstream of legal thought, which was, if the thesis advanced here is correct, moving away from
the legal realism upon which much of the CLS position is based. Finding themselves increasingly
outside the prevailing establishment, CLS proponents might have viewed the founding of a selfconscious "movement!' as an attractive and necessary tactic for identifying and recruiting sympathizers. If this account is accurate, the organization of the CLS group was in part a reaction
to the development of the new normative legal philosophy.
45 For example, Rawls' book, J. RAvLs, supra note 24, was published and received wide
acclaim in 1971. Nozick drafted his book between I971 and 1972. R. Nozicx, supra note 27,
at xv. The sections of Dworkin's book that concerned legal reasoning and adjudication originally
appeared in articles, the first of which, Dworkin, supra note 35, was published in 1967.
This is not to deny that the writings of some of the more senior of the scholars associated
with the CLS group, Duncan Kennedy and Morton Horwitz in particular, have provoked
considerable discussion. Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REv. i685 (1976), is approaching the status of a "classic." Indeed, the CLS group, like the
realists before them, offers insights of value to the new normative legal philosophers. Professor
Sunstein notes the following:
The central achievements of the movement consist, it seems to me, in the emphatic
reminder that legal questions are often questions of political theory, in the effort to
explore the underlying premises of legal doctrine, in the constant attack on the notion of
a value-free legal science, and in the emphasis on the historical contingency of legal rules.
All of those insights are useful correctives to much of what goes on in the courts and in
legal scholarship. The prospect of carrying through the project carries considerable
promise of liberating legal scholarship from a narrowing focus on doctrine alone, and
from an unwillingness to understand the extent to which doctrine may be a product of
highly controversial premises that are often taken for granted.
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 129.
46 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 1203.
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The CLS position borrows heavily from the realist tradition's contention that legal analysis is, and cannot be anything other than, a
smokescreen covering other motives for judicial conduct. In place of
47
the now-unfashionable psychoanalyzing performed by the realists,
the CLS analysis substitutes a neo-Marxist, materialist account of
judicial behavior. This thesis is defended in two principal ways. The
first defense takes the form of an attempt to demonstrate historically
that legal doctrines have changed over the years not for reasons of
the sort included in appellate court opinions, but because of the class
biases of judges and their perceptions of the material needs of a
capitalist society. The second defense is the elaboration of logical
contradictions or "opposing principles" of private law - particularly
in the law of the marketplace, contract law - that supposedly dem48
onstrate the inescapable incoherence of traditional legal reasoning.
The first type of defense can be found in the writings of Morton
Horwitz. In The Transformation of American Law, 4 9 Horwitz contrasts nineteenth century, capitalist-oriented doctrines of private law
with the more communitarian, precapitalist doctrines that allegedly
preceded them and argues that the class sympathies of the judges and
the perceived needs of the time dictated the abandonment of the earlier
doctrines. In an article that appeared in 1979, however, A.W.B.
Simpson examined in detail Horwitz's historical analysis as applied in
the field of contract law, and he demonstrated that no such shift
50
occurred in the law of contracts during the period Horwitz describes.
At the same time, the CLS assertion that traditional legal analysis
is incoherent has been undercut by the new normative philosophers'
comprehensive defense of legal reasoning based on principles and
doctrines. CLS scholars, however, have so far largely avoided any
response to these new developments and have continued to direct their
fire at nineteenth century legal thought and the law-and-economics
approach. The definitive showdown between the CLS group and the
1
new normative philosophers has yet to occur.5

47 See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1935).

48 See, e.g., Feinman, CriticalApproaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983);
Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1983).
49 M. HowRmTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
50 Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533

(1979); see also White, The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671 (1977)
(offering a fundamentally different account of the development of tort theory).
S1For a recent confrontation, see Legal Scholarship:Its Nature and Purposes, go YALE L.J.
955 (ig8i). In this exchange, the CLS scholars discussed law and economics (a favorite topic),
but largely ignored the analyses of Dworkin, Kronman, Fried, Epstein, and O'Driscoll. But
see Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, go YALE L.J. 107, 2028 (1981) (citing Rizzo's
contribution to the Hofstra symposium, Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
641 (ig8o)); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship, Its Causes and Cure, 9o YALE L.J. 1205, 1211 (298i)
(same). In one of the few instances in which a CLS scholar has briefly considered the analysis
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Notwithstanding the claims of the CLS adherents, the new legal
philosophers have made the intellectual climate more receptive to the
traditional legal analysis of scholars like Professor Farnsworth. Legal
positivism, legal realism, and the law-and-economics approach each,
contain insights that have contributed to a better understanding of
law. The new legal philosophers have succeeded, however, in showing
that many of the conclusions of the older schools, such as the positivists' rigid severance of law from morals, the pragmatism of the realists,
and the empiricism of the efficiency approach, are seriously flawed.
By bolstering the jurisprudential foundations of the doctrinal analysis
that treatise writers perform and that Farnsworth's book exemplifies,
the new normative philosophy has made the intellectual world of the
treatise writer a more congenial place. As I suggest in Part II, however, taking justice seriously may require going beyond doctrinal analysis. When a doctrine runs into trouble or when conflicts between
doctrines arise, the treatise writer may need to look to more fundamental notions of justice.
II.
In the preface to his treatise, Professor Farnsworth explains that
he intends the book to be a general treatment of contract law for law
students and practicing lawyers. He envisions "the kind of book that
students might find useful in understanding me or one of my colleagues" - a book drawing on "sources befitting education at the
university level" (p. xix). These sources include the history of assumpsit, the theoretical underpinnings of its development, the Uniform Commercial Code, both Restatements, law review articles, and,
of course, appellate court opinions. The first hundred pages of this
984-page book are taken up with history and theory as Farnsworth
lays the foundation for understanding consideration doctrine and its
of Epstein, see Gordon, supra, at 1045 (discussing Epstein, supra note 7), he appears to have
missed the main thrust of Epstein's position.
Two other members of the CLS group have also considered the new normative philosophy.
In a very brief discussion of the "rights and principles school," Roberto Unger characterizes the
approach as "hocus-pocus." See Unger, supra note 48, at 575. Because Unger cites none of
the works of this "school," it is difficult to be certain of whom he is speaking. But in describing
"the development of a theory of legal process, institutional roles, and purposive legal reasoning
as a response to legal realism," id. at 576, he may very well be referring to the new normative
legal philosophers. Unger characterizes such responses to the insights of legal realism as "endless
moves of confession and avoidance" and "ramshackle and plausible compromises [that] have
been easily mistaken for theoretical insight." Id. Similarly, in her History of Mainstream Legal
Thought, Elizabeth Mensch dismisses both Rawls and Dworkin in a single footnote by characterizing their contribution to jurisprudential thought as "vastly overrated." See Mensch, The
History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW I8, x8 n.* (D. Kairys ed.
1982). It is unclear whether Mensch means by this remark to question the extent of their
influence or the merits of their analysis. See id. at 18-ig.
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modern rationale, the bargain theory. Each section that follows is
similarly prefaced.
By adopting this methodology, Farnsworth has indeed succeeded
in providing a useful resource for anyone seriously interested in contract law. In a refreshing contrast to the traditional case orientation
of first-year courses, Farnsworth exposes students to the myriad
sources of contract law. Lawyers and scholars can easily find advanced materials on a given topic. The book's skillful integration of
history and theory with cases and statutes permits the reader to rise
above doctrinal analysis and see the more important and sometimes
conflicting principles that underlie the rules. Knowing the settled
doctrine of contracts is useful, but being able to cope with conflicts
or gaps among doctrines requires a theoretical and historical framework. This book helps to make such a framework available by exposing the reader to a full range of resources.
The book's organization is theoretically sound: it begins with a
treatment of the enforceability of promises (including a brief discussion
of restitution); second, it probes the scope and effect of promises; next,
it examines the rights of third parties; and it concludes with an
analysis of the enforcement of promises (remedies). Recognizing, however, the not inconsiderable advantages of understanding (and therefore teaching) remedies before contract formation, Farnsworth takes
a page to set forth the various damage "interests" before he discusses
consideration, and he refers the reader to the section on damages for
a more elaborate analysis (pp. 39-40).
In addition to being thoughtfully organized, the book is exceedingly
well written. It is not only interesting, but actually fun to read. I
have recommended this book to my students, and what impressed
them most was the clarity of Farnsworth's exposition and the ease
with which he made the intricacies of the subject understandable.
A good example of this achievement is Farnsworth's explanation
of the differing interests - expectation, reliance, and restitution that determine the extent of liability, and his account of the limitations
on recoverable damages (pp. 814-i6). Having introduced his section
on remedies with discussions of such topics as the purposes and types
of remedies, their "economic aspects," and the historical development
of equitable relief and its forms, Farnsworth moves to the tripartite
interest analysis made famous by Fuller and Perdue. 52 In just a few
pages he succinctly explains the message and method of their analysis
and then supplements this discussion with a series of formulas (and
alternative formulas) that illustrate the interests under varying circumstances.5 3 Although it is desirable that students read the original
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1-& 2),46 YA,.- L.J.
373 (r936).
53 For example, Farnsworth characterizes the general measure of expectancy recovery as
S2
52,

follows: "general measure = loss in value + other loss - loss avoided" (p. 848).
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Fuller and Perdue article, at points the piece lacks enough illustrations
and exposition to make the distinctions clear to all readers. Students
of mine for whom this caused confusion were greatly helped by Farnsworth. And those who thought they understood the article and its
applications had to make that understanding square with Farnsworth's
explanation and formulas - an effort that reinforced the learning
process quite nicely.
The book's superb annotations enhance its value to students learn54
ing the law of contracts. Virtually every case in the casebook I use
is discussed at some point. The book's comprehensiveness makes it
useful even for students whose professors do not employ the same
conceptual scheme or terminology that Farnsworth does, for in most
cases a student need only turn to the treatise's table of cases to find
a discussion that relates to the materials covered in class. If a casebook provides the bricks for the student's understanding of contracts,
this richly detailed book provides the mortar and, on some topics, the
blueprint as well. The book's thoroughness also makes it useful to
practicing attorneys and teachers who are either reviewing or first
exploring selected topics.
As an aid to learning and research, Farnsworth's Contracts is a
masterpiece of style and substance. If contract doctrine has its problems, the careful and systematic analysis that Farnsworth brings to
bear upon it greatly reduces them. Being able to turn to this book
was like having Professor Farnsworth at my side, patiently pointing
out the intellectual lay of the land and suggesting sources of further
information. In short, Contracts will permit students, professionals,
or academic readers to delve as far into the subject of contracts as
their needs and curiosity take them.
As good as it is, though, the book is not without its weaknesses.
Farnsworth seeks primarily to promote an understanding of existing
doctrines and their historical development. But where these doctrines
reflect unresolved tensions and conflicts among underlying theories of
contractual obligation and liability, the book does little to resolve the
disputes. In particular, the book fails to mediate the apparent conflict
between the bargain theory of consideration and the classic cases that
seem to base contractual obligation on principles of reliance.5 5 This
5 M. FREEDMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (1973). Because Freedman includes a number of old or somewhat obscure cases, his casebook is a reasonably rigorous standard
by which to measure the treatise's comprehensiveness.
55 See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). A useful repository of these
classic cases is F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1970). The
illustrations and Reporter's notes to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979) are
also valuable.
Some commentators see a tension between the bargain theory and the notion of unconscionability. See Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REV. 741 (1982).
Although I will not discuss Farnsworth's treatment of unconscionability, it appears to suffer
from much the same deficiency that I attribute to his treatment of reliance. See infra pp. 123844.
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conflict cannot be resolved at the doctrinal level; any solution requires
an analysis of the philosophy that underlies contractual obligation. It
is here that the realms of jurisprudence and the treatise intersect.
The premise that contractual obligation derives from the act of
promising, together with the theory that contractual freedom should
be maximized, suggests the need for a formal theory of consideration. 5 6 If contractual obligation is essentially promissory, courts need
some means of distinguishing enforceable promises from unenforceable
promises. The protection of contractual freedom seems to require as
formal a criterion as possible, for the more formal the criterion, the
less courts will be able surreptitiously to substitute the judge's terms
for those of the parties.
The bargain theory of consideration handsomely fits the bill. It
specifies that consideration is present, and that a promise is therefore
enforceable, when the promise is "bargained for." Farnsworth adopts
the definition of bargain contained in section 71(2) of the Restatement
5 7 "Something is said to be bargained for 'if it
(Second) of Contracts:
is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by
the promisee in exchange for that promise"' (pp. 41-42). According
to the bargain theory, if a promise is really "bargained for," a court
has no need to inquire into the substance of what was bargained for
and in general will simply enforce the promise. While thus protecting
contractual freedom, such a criterion efficiently captures most commercial transactions in which the parties contemplated the possibility
of legal enforcement. Strangers do not usually consummate a bargain
without intending that it have a legal effect.
As Farnsworth notes, however, a bargain theory of consideration
is unavoidably plagued by serious defects. First, although the requirement that a bargain be present may effectively identify most commercial situations in which the parties intend promises to carry legal
consequences, some cases will slip through the cracks. Contractual
intent may be present in a number of situations in which the element
of bargain is absent, both in commercial transactions and in "transactions taking place outside or on the periphery of the marketplace"
(p. 42). Farnsworth lists several categories of cases involving "gratuitous" or unbargained-for promises: promises to convey land, promises by bailees, promises to give to charities, and promises made in
the family setting (pp. 9o-91). Another example would be unbar-

gained-for "firm" offers. In such cases, legal consequences may be
intended by both parties or reasonably understood by one party to be

56 See A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (1975); see also
Helmholz, Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, 9i LAW Q. REv. 406 (1975) (discussing origin of
assumpsit). Simpson's account shows that before the rise of assumpsit, the doctrine of consideration, as it is conceived today, did not exist. See A. SIMPSON, supra, at 316-26.
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2) (1979).
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intended; but because there is no bargain, there is no consideration
and, therefore, no enforceable promise under a bargain theory. The
bargain theory cannot by itself account for the legal enforcement of
these promises.
A second, more obscure problem is to define the limits of enforceability when a bargained-for exchange has occurred but the substance
of the exchange is objectionable. Under the bargain theory, the mere
fact that an exchange is bargained for provides a sufficient basis for
contractual enforcement, and a court may not inquire into the substance of the exchange. This approach seeks to facilitate the freedom
of individuals to enter into agreements of their choosing. It is always
possible, however, to identify instances in which, although a bargain
existed, intuitions (and case law) suggest that the resulting agreement
should not be enforced. A contract for the performance of an illegal
act is one example. A contract for indentured servitude is an extreme
but nonetheless theoretically and historically significant example as
well.5 8 The bargain theory cannot by itself account for these and
other accepted limitations on the parties' right to engage in legally
effective bargaining.
Farnsworth responds to the first difficulty with the bargain theory
by straddling the fence. The approach he adopts - not surprisingly,
given his instrumental role in its formulation - is that of the Second
Restatement: the formal requirement of bargained-for consideration is
retained 9 and the (comparatively few) cases that are problematic
under a formal bargain theory are handled by supplementary (some
would say ad hoc) doctrines, such as promissory estoppel, that allow
for recovery in the absence of a bargain. The attempt to remedy the
problems of the bargain theory with gap fillers like section 9o of the
Restatement60 could reasonably be credited with having saved contract
law (and freedom of contract) from the death that some had wished
it,6 1 but it has not proved entirely satisfactory. This "solution" has
codified the tension between, on the one hand, the freedom of individuals to enter or refrain from entering into legally binding agreements and, on the other hand, the postulated right of individuals to
58 See Dodd, From Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages: Six Centuries of Regulation of
Employment Contracts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 643, 66o-6s (1943).
59 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979).
60

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Id. § go(i).
61 Farnsworth notes that "[tihe failure of the doctrine of consideration to provide a more
satisfactory basis for enforcing such promises might have brought greater pressure to reform the
doctrine had it not been for the increasing recognition of reliance as an alternative ground for

recovery" (p. 89).
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receive legal compensation for injuries that result from reliance on the
verbal conduct of others who may have had no intention to be legally
bound. The bargain theory of consideration, reflecting the principle
of contractual freedom, is thereby placed on a collision course with
section-9o-type responses, which are based on a principle of reliance
that imposes liability despite the absence of manifestations of intent
to be legally bound. The exception constantly threatens to swallow
the rule.
Farnsworth's justification for reliance-based recovery highlights its
extracontractual nature:
The possibility of an answer founded on principles of tort law is
inescapable, particularly if recovery is limited to the reliance measure.
One person has caused harm to another by making a promise that he
should reasonably have expected would cause harm, and he is therefore held liable for the harm caused. (Pp. 97-98).
When Farnsworth alludes to this basis of recovery later in his discussion of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 6 2 the tension created by such a
justification becomes clearer: "[A]lthough the court spoke of promissory estoppel, its decision may fit better into that field of liability for
blameworthy conduct that we know as tort, instead of that field of
liability based on obligations voluntarily assumed that we call contract" (p. 192). In short, if a court finds a party's verbal conduct to
be "blameworthy," it may impose liability even when it is aware that
the promisor did not intend to bind himself.
It is a significant deficiency of the book that Farnsworth nowhere
attempts to resolve this tension. Instead, he sidesteps the issue by
pointing out that because such reliance cases involve the enforcement
of a promise, they are contracts cases "within our definition of the
term" (p. 98).63 Clearly, a definitional discussion of the tort-contract
distinction is inadequatelto account for, much less resolve, the apparent tension between freedom of contract and reliance-based liability.
Without a substantial treatment of this problem, no comprehensive
book on contract law can be considered entirely satisfactory. 64
It might be more productive and realistic to conceive of contractual
obligation in the following way. Parties bring to transactions pre26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
At pages 3-6, Farnsworth adopts the Restatement's definition of a "contract" as "a promise
or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § I
(1979).
64 For a treatise that does extensively treat the issue, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 613-22 (4 th ed. 1971). For further discussions of the issue, see, for
example, Fridman, The Interaction of Tort and Contract, 93 LAW Q. Rv. 422 (i977); Hill,
Breach of Contract as Tort, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 40 (i974); Poulton, Tort or Contract, 82 LAw
62
63

Q. REv. 346 (i966); Snyder, Promissory Estoppel as Tort, 35 IOWA L. REv.

28

(i949).
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existing rights to resources in the world; some of these rights are
alienable, others are not. Verbal commitments should be enforceable
as contracts when the parties effectuate the unilateral or bilateral
transfer of alienable rights to resources in the world by manifesting
their consent to a legally binding transfer. Thus, in an agreement to
transfer a present or future right to property, the consensual transfer
of alienable rights is itself the object of the agreement. In an agreement to perform or refrain from performing an act in the future, the
object of the agreement is to obtain performance, but legal enforcement of the agreement should be available only if both parties have
manifested a commitment to pay damages for breach. Such a commitment is a transfer of rights to the money, conditioned on nonperformance - a transfer that serves the purpose of providing a legal
incentive for performance. The manifestation of consent to transfer
alienable rights that characterizes both types of agreements may best
capture what has traditionally been meant by the phrase "consent to
be legally bound." Similarly, consent to alter ordinary tort duties of
care and thereby to alter the presumptive legal distribution of risk of
loss is also consent to transfer preexisting rights.
Laying the theoretical foundation for actual application of this
approach would require a two-step analysis. The first step would be
an inquiry into rights: what rights do we have, which of them are
alienable, and by what means are they alienated? Such an analysis
would have to establish that one way in which rights may be alienated
is by a manifestation of consent on the part of the rightholder. 65 The
second step would be an analysis of what constitutes a manifestation
of consent sufficient to indicate the presence of a contract.6 6 Thus,
to decide a contracts dispute, a court would occasionally have to carry
out the first-level inquiry to determine enforceability; in most cases,
however, the court would simply apply the principles and doctrines
discerned in the second step - the determination of what constitutes
consent - to the facts of the dispute to see if consent was present.
Under such a consent theory of contract, the existence of a bargained-for exchange would be viewed as important evidence of consent
to transfer rights. But this form of evidence would be neither a
necessary nor even always a sufficient condition of recovery. In the
absence of a bargain, a court could enforce commitments and still act
consistently with the notion of contractual freedom if a party had
6S Cf. P. ATIYAH, supra note 7, at 177 ("[P]romising may be reducible to a species of consent,
for consent is a broader and perhaps more basic source of obligation.'). Of course, acts other
than the consent of a rightholder - for example, torts - may transfer rights noncontractually,
and a rights theory must specify the nature of these acts as well.
66 "Now consent takes many forms, of which the explicit promise is only one; other types
of consent may sometimes be regarded as justifying the implication of a promise, but they are
often more naturally described without reference to the concept of promises at all." Id. at 179-
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manifested his consent to a transfer of rights in some other way. For

example, the exchange of nominal consideration of one dollar for a
promise would signify consent to the legal enforcement of a damage

award for nonperformance.

By "tak[ing] the trouble to cast their

transaction in the form of an exchange,"

67

the parties would have

manifested such consent. By contrast, under a traditional bargain
theory, nominal consideration of this sort would be considered a

"sham" without legal effect, because the promisor has not bargained
68

for the dollar.
In the same manner, acts undertaken by one party in reliance on
the commitment of another might under certain circumstances (usually
present in the "hard" cases) provide valid evidence of a manifested

consent to the transfer of rights. For example, a promisor's silence in
the face of substantial reliance by the promisee might manifest to the

promisee a legally binding intention.6 9 Under a consent theory, the
enforcement of an obligation because of reliance or formalities would

not be an exception to a regime of bargained-for exchange. Instead,
some instances of reliance, like formalities, would demonstrate that

the other party had in fact consented to transfer rights even absent
' 70
the conclusion of a "bargain."

Stanley D. Henderson has noted that reliance has sometimes been
viewed as evidence of a bargain rather than of consent. "Reliance,

under this approach, functions not as a substantive ground for enforcement, but as a vehicle for identification of some other ground for

enforcement.", 7 1 The problem with this approach is that, "[b]ecause
the cases which most clearly warrant the application of Section go
67 Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLuM. L. REV. 799, 820 (1941).
68 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 comment d (1979). Id. § 87(1), however,
makes even recitals of purported consideration sufficient to render an offer enforceable as an
option contract.
69 See, e.g., Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882); Roberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94 N.J.
Eq. 82, ix8 A. 275 (1922). In each of these cases, the extensive reliance by a promisee on a
promise to convey land, coupled with the apparent knowledge of a promisor who remained
silent, would seem objectively to indicate consent by the promisor even in the absence of
bargained-for consideration or subjective assent. The judge in each case, however, thought that
enforcement of the promise required an equitable exception to or modification of the doctrine
of consideration.
70 Similarly, the law of evidence holds that silence can sometimes be taken as an admission:
If a statement is made by another person in the presence of a party to the action,
containing assertions of facts which, if untrue, the party would under all the circumstances
naturally be expected to deny, his failure to speak has traditionally been receivable against
him as an admission. Whether the justification for receiving the evidence is the assumption that the party has intended to express his assent and thus has adopted the statement
as his own, or the probable state of belief to be inferred from his conduct is probably
unimportant.
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 651-52 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (emphasis
added; citations omitted).
71 Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343,
348 (i969).

1244

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1223

seldom involve reliance which is beneficial to the promisor, a causal
relation between putative bargain and factual reliance is likely to be
difficult to find."' 72 Although reliance would serve a similar function
under a consent theory, it is a much better indication of consent than
of a bargain, because the promisor's consent can be, and in such cases
usually is, manifested by silence in the face of the promisee's acts of
reliance even when the promisor has received no demonstrable benefit.
The source of the problem for Farnsworth and others 73 who are
not unsympathetic to freedom of contract but are stymied by instances
of "reasonable reliance" is their acceptance of a definition of contract
that is limited to promises of future performance. This definition
excludes from the category of contract all transactions that involve
present exchanges of rights - transactions including such obviously
bilateral transfers as cash sales. Farnsworth argues that "[b]ecause
no promise is given in . . . [such] exchanges, there is no contract" (p.
4). The exclusive focus on future performance in the definition of
contract blinds the theorist to the fact that promises to perform in the
future are enforceable only when they display the same moral component as do present exchanges of property: a present consent to
transfer alienable rights manifested by one person to another.
Finally, a consent theory of contract might also provide a way to
alleviate the other failing of the bargain theory: its apparent inconsistency with the courts' refusal to enforce certain formally valid contracts, such as slavery contracts or contracts to violate the rights of
another. If contractual obligation is based on consent to transfer or
alienate rights, the existence of a contract requires more than consent.
Underlying any inquiry into the existence of a contract is an implicit
or explicit inquiry into the nature of the rights at stake in a transaction. If a court identifies the rights involved in a particular transaction
as inalienable ones, the question whether there has been consent to a
transfer becomes simply irrelevant; regardless of consent, no transfer
can occur. Under a consent theory, therefore, even a commitment
manifested by a bargain or other evidence would not always be enforceable.
Questions regarding the nature of the rights subject to contractual
alienation cannot be answered solely in terms of contract theory; their
answers require the sort of moral inquiry we associate with political
and legal philosophy. But resort to such concerns in a particular
instance does not signal the failure of the consent theory. On the
contrary, the theory specifies that such concerns should play an integral role in resolving the deeper moral problems that. a finding of
consent may sometimes raise. Indeed, the moral justification for consent-based enforceability can be provided only by underlying notions
72

Id.

73 See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 5, at 24-25 (discussing promises and reliance).
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of rights. The two-step analysis under a consent theory - that is,
the bifurcated inquiry into rights and consent - shows the proper
relationship between contract theory and a more fundamental theory
of justice based on rights. The analysis can thus explain the source
of many of the extracontractual considerations that courts currently
incorporate into contract law under the loose heading of "public policy" but that are completely unaccounted for by either a bargain or a
reliance theory of contractual obligation. 74 The consent theory's capacity to encompass these extrinsic concerns points the way toward
the integration of contract75 doctrine with more fundamental theories
of justice based on rights.

mI.
In this otherwise excellent book, Professor Farnsworth makes no
attempt to resolve some basic tensions created by contract theory. As
a result, he can describe but cannot resolve the conflicting doctrines
that have arisen in response. It would be premature to conclude from
this deficiency, however, that contract law must be collapsed into
torts. What is needed - and, I suggest, possible - is a theory of
justice that explains when legal force, whether it is exercised in the
realm of contract or of tort, is morally justified. Such a theory must
articulate the rights people have and the ways in which these rights
may be consensually or nonconsensually alienated. The fact that this
is precisely the mission upon which the new moral and legal philosophers have embarked highlights the importance of legal philosophy
and the direct role it can play in developing legal doctrines. The
treatise writer is not only dependent on the philosopher to demonstrate
the legitimacy of his enterprise. He or she is also in need of the
philosopher's theory of justice, without which a completely coherent
doctrinal analysis will remain elusive.
74 Although I have not specified the defects of a reliance theory of contract, they are both
numerous and serious. See, e.g., Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REV. 533, 57980 (1933) (a reliance theory does not specify which types of reliance merit protection and which

do not).
7S Of course, I can only sketch the rough outlines of a consent theory here. Complete
explication of the theory (including, for instance, an elaboration of the important differences
between a consent theory and a will theory) is a much broader enterprise, in which I am
currently engaged.

